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FELIX K. CHANG and JONATHAN GOLDMAN
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N

o bombs need fall from the sky. Yet damage can be inflicted on the
United States through market manipulation that would be as costly to
recover from as any conventional attack. The threat of financial and commodity market manipulation is not new. What is new is the ability of a foreign government to use manipulation in a way that would cause a swift and systemic
economic crisis in the United States. Such actions could be taken without ever
clashing with the American military—offering those without the military capability to penetrate America’s defenses an asymmetric tactic for direct attack. That a foreign government could do so should be a major concern for all
of America’s political and military strategists.

Market Manipulation
Many economists harbor doubts whether such an incident could ever
occur. They discount the idea that any country would attempt large-scale market manipulation against another, because the harmful effects of any such
effort would inevitably rebound on the perpetrator, given the complex interrelationships among national economies. Since rational leaders would not
take any action that would ultimately harm their own interests, no legitimate
government would seriously consider such a strategy.
Yet, in August 2007, two members linked to the Chinese government and economic research institutes did just that. In a speech, one commented that “Beijing’s foreign reserves should be used as a ‘bargaining chip’
in talks with the United States.” The other intimated that China could use its
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large foreign exchange reserves of dollars to precipitate a “mass depreciation
of the dollar,” if the United States continued to pressure it to revalue its currency. Although China’s central bank eventually disavowed the comments
and reiterated its role as “a responsible investor in the international capital
markets,” the idea of such an action had clearly been surfaced at the highest
levels of the Chinese government.1
The danger of a destabilizing market manipulation incident has historically threatened only those countries whose economies were heavily reliant
on a single commodity or financing instrument. Developed nations with deep
and diverse economies, such as the United States, have seemed above this sort
of manipulation. Many countries in the developed world have, however, increasingly grown attached to financing their accounts and budget deficits with
debt that is traded internationally. While doing so gives these governments access to new capital and aids in sustaining their economic growth, the resulting
debt is exposed to external influences—possibly manipulation—affecting foreign exchange and interest rates. The danger from manipulation would be
higher still if any single entity were to gain control over a substantial portion of
a nation’s traded assets.
The market movements that led to the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism’s demise in 1992, the Mexican peso devaluation in 1994, the Asian
financial crisis in 1997-98, and the near collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 demonstrated the possibility of such actions. The
first two examples illustrate how foreign speculators could amass enough leverage that they might overwhelm the ability of European central banks to
counter their actions and, in doing so, disrupt national economic policies. The
third example, the Asian financial crisis, reveals how a crisis in confidence
among foreign investors could spread from the markets to the actual economy,
ruining economic interests and spreading panic on a global scale. The LTCM
incident highlighted the fact that a swift and systemic crisis could not only be
caused by an entity as small as a hedge fund (albeit a heavily leveraged one),
but was also capable of imperiling the world’s largest economy.2

Felix K. Chang is a partner at CVP Ventures and an associate scholar at the Foreign
Policy Research Institute. He formerly served as a consultant at Booz Allen Hamilton, a
senior planner and intelligence officer at the US Department of Defense, and as a business
adviser to Mobil Oil Corporation.
Jonathan Goldman is a partner at Silverado Partners. Previously, he was managing
director and global head of emerging market currency trading at Bank of America and an
investment banker at Citibank.
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Historically, American markets have not been immune to market
manipulation, at least of the nonsystemic sort. The Hunt brothers tried to corner the silver market from 1979-80. A decade later, Solomon Brothers endeavored to do the same in the US Treasury market. As recently as 2006,
British Petroleum attempted to corner the American propane market, while
UBS and Credit Suisse traders tried to squeeze certain US Treasury securities
in the repurchase market. These events underscore just how prevalent manipulative schemes really are. They serve as important reminders that any market, even the most knowledgeable and resilient, can be misled. 3
Fortunately for the United States, its financial and commodity markets are so large and diverse that triggering a swift and systemic economic crisis would be difficult, due to the enormous amounts of capital required. That
may not, however, always be the case. In August 2007, a near-systemic crisis
gripped the global debt markets when financial institutions worldwide reacted
to the chain of consequences emanating from the deterioration of US subprime
mortgages. Even after the Federal Reserve aggressively and repeatedly slashed
interest rates, it was not until spring, well into 2008, before the debt markets began to loosen. All this has demonstrated just how quickly underlying economic
factors can combine into a crisis that threatens American economic stability,
even in the absence of a manipulative incident.4

Converging Factors
Over the course of the last century, a number of related economic
factors have developed. Individually, they may not appear overly menacing.
As they have converged, however, the combination has made the United
States vulnerable to the kind of swift and systemic economic crisis previously
described—one triggered by means of market manipulation. As modern central banks evolved, they were hailed as a mechanism that would help keep inflation at bay, provide liquidity to a nation’s banking sector in times of crisis,
and play a critical role in maintaining economic growth. The central bank
does so through control of a nation’s currency and monetary supply. As creations of governments, most central banks are not free from political influence; they are only as independent as the rules governing them permit. Even
the 300-year-old Bank of England did not gain its full independence until
1997. So, in spite of their economic focus, political motives are present in the
decisionmaking processes exercised by central banks around the world.
Since the 1970s, electronic funds transfers have become the prevalent
form of transaction in the global financial industry. They have permitted financial transactions to be conducted with ever-increasing speed and in ever-larger
volumes. That speed and volume have become so great that complex trading
strategies can effectively be hidden from view; the collapse of the LTCM demSpring 2008
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“Historically, American markets have not been
immune to market manipulation, at
least of the nonsystemic sort.”

onstrated this phenomenon on a large scale in the latter-1990s. Electronic
transactions can also outpace the markets’ ability to contend with them, as was
seen during the market crash in October 1987 when the full impact of
computer-directed selling and an illiquid market was first felt. In the ensuing
carnage, the US equity market lost a stunning 23 percent of its overall value.
To provide markets with liquidity on a daily basis, traders have long
used leverage, mainly in the form of derivative instruments. Derivatives provide a means to hedge risk as well as take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. They are also used to magnify various trading strategies. Since the 1990s
the amount of leverage on international markets has grown exponentially. It
has increased even faster in this decade as the Federal Reserve’s interest rate
cuts pumped greater liquidity into global markets. The massive amount of leverage that international financier George Soros used to derail the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992 has become common just a mere decade
later. That amount of leverage and its corresponding market-moving potential are now available to an increasing number of well-capitalized traders, private equity funds, and sovereign wealth funds. In a crisis, such leverage could
very easily serve to hasten market failure. 5
Another factor is the US government’s willingness to consistently run
large federal budget deficits. Because of the federal budget’s enormous scale,
surpassing $2.8 trillion in 2007, financing even a fraction of such a budget has
required substantial issuances of US Treasury securities. When coupled with
foreign demand, such issuances can feed a virtuous cycle where increased debt
levels do not increase US interest rates. When they occur in tandem with foreign exchange rate pegs to the dollar, however, the issuance of such securities
may eventually lead to financial imbalances on a global scale.6
Some imbalance is to be expected, due to foreign central bank demand for dollars, the world’s main reserve currency, as a reserve asset. Further
exacerbating this imbalance, however, has been the persistent US trade deficit.
Whenever American companies sell dollars to buy local currencies in an effort
to pay for foreign imports, foreign central banks buy US Treasury securities in
46
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an attempt to maintain their foreign exchange rate. Doing so not only keeps
their export-oriented economies competitive in the global marketplace, it helps
to build a currency reserve providing a buffer against the sort of financial crisis
that ravaged Asia in 1997-98. So long as nations can keep their domestic inflation in check, foreign central banks can amass vast reserves of US Treasury securities, such as those currently seen in China, Japan, and the Middle East. 7
Of course, anyone can buy (and sell) US Treasury securities, including those nations that are adversaries of the United States. Before the 1940s,
those who held US Treasury securities were more likely to be institutions and
investors rather than foreign central banks. America’s Cold War antagonists,
such as the Soviet Union, never held large amounts of US government debt for
fear of creating strong financial and trade ties between the two camps.8 Today
many nations accumulate dollar reserves both as a reserve asset and a means by
which to finance trade. In doing so, a few foreign central banks have amassed
enough reserves that they could exert a major impact on US financial markets.
In February 2005, when the central bank of South Korea—a country
holding $200 billion in dollar reserves at the time—hinted that it would diversify its foreign exchange holdings into other currencies and purchase fewer
US Treasury securities, the financial markets were immediately unnerved.
Despite the fact that the South Korean central bank never suggested it would
sell its securities, the South Korean currency dramatically rose against the
dollar and fixed-income markets slumped. While markets have become accustomed to such diversification strategies as more countries have adopted
them since, one wonders what the impact would be if a country holding far
more US Treasury securities actively sold them. 9
In the meantime, the growth in global demand for oil has strained the
world’s production capacity. As a result, the price of oil on commodity markets has steadily risen over the past eight years and become highly sensitive to
supply disruptions. Certainly disruptions in supply from any major oil producer will send oil prices sharply higher. Of course, oil is a largely fungible
commodity; and a rise in its price impacts all of its consumers, just as it did
when OPEC, along with Egypt and Syria, stopped oil shipments to the United
States in October 1973. The current tightness in the oil market, however, has a
structural cause. The economic growth of China and India since the 1990s has
been so rapid that it elevated the worldwide demand for oil. For the moment,
this heightened demand has outstripped the pace at which the oil industry can
expand reserves; an industry still suffering from years of underinvestment
during the 1980s and early 1990s.10
When the price of oil began to rise early in this decade, national
governments—who had handsomely rewarded western oil companies in the
past for their ability to marshal the necessary technical skills and financing
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to develop oil fields—discovered that they no longer needed to do so.
Rather, their state-owned oil companies could hire the same oilfield services to provide these skills. As capital markets were extended in the 1990s,
nations executed financing through debt issuances and equity markets in
much the same manner as western oil companies. All of this enabled energy
nationalism, which first arose from the nationalist movements in the early
1960s, to regain its stature in the developing world and to threaten western
oil companies with possible exclusion from the world’s best oilfields.

Politics and Market Manipulation
One need not look far to see examples of short-term political goals
prevailing over long-term economic interests, particularly when national
leaders take economic resilience for granted. Political priorities often trump
economic concerns. The use of economic means to advance political priorities is symptomatic of that phenomenon and can take many forms—from
sweeping measures, for instance tariffs and embargoes, to highly targeted
ones, such as sanctioned corporate espionage and leverage over financial and
commodity instruments on international markets.
Countries without a strong military must find alternative or supplementary ways to fight a superior foe, if they are to prevail. That may entail
hobbling an adversary’s economy. The OPEC oil embargo against the United
States in retaliation for supporting Israel during the Yom Kippur War underscored such a strategy. Though ultimately unsuccessful, it did demonstrate
that the United States could be markedly impacted, if actions were executed
under the right economic conditions. Foreign governments still regard the
United States as vulnerable to this type of market manipulation; primarily, because the American government is so beholden to its economically sensitive
citizens. Many of these foreign governments believe that once the American
public is forced to endure hardship, it will pressure Washington to concede to
at least some of their demands.

The Case of China
Despite a symbiotic economic relationship whereby China benefits
from economic and industrial development and the United States benefits
from high consumption and low interest rates, the two nations still harbor a
disruptive political disagreement over the fate of Taiwan. For Beijing, the political stakes are high. Taiwan’s reunification “plays a special role in maintaining the legitimacy of the [Chinese] communist regime because it involves
territorial integrity and national unity, a symbolic value to Chinese nationalism.”11 Nationalism is especially important in light of the demise of commu48
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“Fortunately for the United States, its financial
and commodity markets are so large and
diverse that triggering a swift and
systemic economic crisis
would be difficult.”

nism as the raison d’être for China’s one-party rule. So, Chinese leaders
believe that they have little flexibility on this issue.12 Even though China has
markedly improved its military capabilities in the last two decades, its leaders
recognize that, should any dispute result in open conflict, winning a military
struggle against the United States—Taiwan’s principal protector—would be
difficult. A more logical way for China to improve its odds would be to pressure Washington by means of financial and commodity market manipulation.
Such an asymmetric tactic would strain the will of the American public and
potentially sow confusion in Washington, allowing Beijing to gain a diplomatic or possible military advantage.
China’s ability to precipitate such an incident largely rests on its
rise as a leading economic power. Its growth has been nothing short of remarkable. By loosening the communist fetters on its economy and injecting
easy bank credit, Beijing pursued an export-driven economic development
policy similar to that of Japan and Southeast Asia during the 1970s and
1980s. China’s success can be seen in its rising share of global industrial
production and the accompanying demand for raw materials. The continuation of China’s extraordinary growth has confounded many of its fiscal and
monetary policy critics. 13
Among the most important factors contributing to China’s economic
boom has been the ability of its central bank, the People’s Bank of China
(PBOC), to keep the exchange rate between the Chinese renminbi and the US
dollar generally fixed, while keeping inflation at bay. A stable exchange rate
encourages export-oriented businesses to make the long-term investments
needed to build a new and increasingly sophisticated manufacturing base.
Learning from the Japanese experience, China has been loath to allow a speedy
revaluation of its currency. The fact that the PBOC has begun to do so over the
last two years has not been the result of American pressure. Rather, the central
bank has done so in an effort to stem domestic inflationary pressures.14
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By maintaining its currency at a particular level against the dollar, the
PBOC has accumulated an enormous amount of dollar reserves from China’s
trade surplus and foreign investment inflow. At the end of 2007 the PBOC held
reserves approaching $1.5 trillion, more than any other central bank. No doubt,
China’s central bank sees the benefit of holding such reserves as a hedge
against the sort of speculation that triggered the Asian financial crisis. But
China has been concerned about the expansion of liquidity within its capitalcontrolled borders. As the only Chinese entity allowed to invest overseas, the
PBOC placed $200 billion of its foreign exchange reserves—$80 billion of
which is dedicated to external investment—into a sovereign wealth fund called
China Investment Corporation, in an attempt to rebalance capital flows. The
fund has already invested $8 billion in Blackstone and Morgan Stanley. It is
reportedly planning to put in an additional $3 billion to $4 billion into a US
private-equity firm that invests in distressed financial institutions, thereby
sidestepping the potential political backlash from direct investment in iconic
American companies.15
At the same time, China has become a major contender in international commodity markets, particularly in energy and metal arenas. Its expanding economy has dramatically accelerated the country’s demand for
electricity and fuel. Those demands are so great that they helped boost the
pace of global oil consumption, significantly contributing to the increase in
oil prices since 2000.16 Similarly, the Chinese economy has driven advances
in the demand for aluminum, copper, iron, and nickel. The prices for these
metals have more than doubled in recent years, as Chinese firms import huge
quantities for industrial use and large-scale construction projects. 17
China’s Economic Might
Of the countries in the world that could precipitate a financial and commodity market incident, China heads the list. The PBOC’s substantial holdings
of US Treasury securities place it in a strong position from which to take advantage of the dollar’s weakened state. As mentioned previously, Chinese officials
are well aware of their ability to influence the American economy through the
sale of securities. Selling even a portion of their holdings would cause the dollar
to tumble and set off a spiral of selling. If such an event were to occur US
short-term interest rates would sharply rise and American corporations and financial institutions would find access to capital far more expensive.18
Beijing could also influence international commodity markets
through its links to oil-rich countries. Many of these governments are already unhappy with the United States—such as Iran and Venezuela, whose
combined oil resources comprise 18 percent of the world’s total. If even one
of these nations were to initiate a supply disruption, the price of oil would
50

Parameters

surge. China and Iran have already found a common interest in restraining
what they perceive as American hegemony. Beijing supported Tehran in the
United Nations Security Council when the latter faced economic sanctions
over its nuclear weapons program in 2006. Their relationship was further
strengthened the following year when Sinopec, a Chinese oil company, won
the right to develop the Yadavaran oil and gas field in Iran. Venezuela’s
President Hugo Chávez, who shares a similar view of the United States,
clearly prefers Chinese oil companies to western ones. 19
Consequences of China’s Actions
The simultaneous dramatic devaluation of the US dollar and a sharp
increase in oil prices would immediately unsettle global equity and bond markets. During such times of uncertainty, institutions and investors normally
seek a safe haven where their assets will hold value. For much of the twentieth
century, that haven has been the dollar. In this hypothetical, however, the dollar would be at the epicenter of uncertainty, as China unloads its US Treasury
securities in favor of gold or euros. Aggravating the situation, institutions and
investors of all stripes would magnify the selling pressure as they tried to shed
their own devalued US assets—liquidity would rapidly disappear.
Were the dollar to unexpectedly fall 10 percent along with equivalent declines in American equity and bond markets, these changes would reduce American wealth by $1.3 trillion (or 11 percent of gross domestic
product [GDP]), according to one International Monetary Fund working paper.20 Beyond the immediate market upheaval, the combined effect of any
sudden loss of wealth, a lack of liquidity, and higher energy costs would stagger the US economy. American companies involved in the importation of raw
materials or oil would see costs soar. Those companies reliant on Chinese
suppliers would find their supply chains in total disarray. In the long run, the
collapse could cast doubt on the reliability of the US dollar as a risk-free asset, permanently impacting interest rates.
Of course, China would also feel the repercussions of its actions. The
value of its remaining dollar holdings would decline, lowering its national
wealth by as much as 4.5 percent of GDP.21 Assuming that trade was not suspended altogether, Chinese business would suffer as the revalued Chinese currency made Chinese goods less competitive. The resultant economic recession
in the United States would further reduce the demand for Chinese products.
Many Chinese exporters would be pressed to the limit as their margins dwindled. The small appreciation of China’s currency in 2006 has already caused
some to scramble to find ways to stay in business.22 Unemployment would undoubtedly increase in many of China’s cities, especially those with economies
closely connected to exports. Yet a cooling Chinese economy could ease inflaSpring 2008
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tionary pressures and permit the PBOC to lower official interest rates in an effort to keep the economy afloat. Higher oil prices, however, would keep
inflation as an ever-present threat. At the same time, lending rates might actually increase as the demand for credit becomes greater, given the likely rise in
nonperforming loans, accompanied by a decline in Chinese corporate credit
quality, both of which would place greater strain on China’s banks.
Even though the United States might be the primary target of China’s
market manipulation efforts, the reverberations would be felt worldwide. Financial losses from a sudden decline in the US dollar and on various markets,
as described previously, could reduce wealth in Western Europe by 3.1 percent,
Japan by 4.1 percent, Latin America by 1.1 percent, and Taiwan by 8.1 percent
of GDP. About two-thirds of these losses would stem from the dollar’s devaluation with the remaining third coming from the drop in America’s equity and
bond markets. Those countries holding dollar-denominated bonds issued by
foreign governments could lose as much as another one percent. Any slowdown in American and Chinese economies at the same time when accompanied
by higher oil prices would have a ripple effect around the world.23

Failure of Deterrence
Financial and commodity market manipulation on this scale could
bring about unintended and unforeseen consequences. In this hypothetical
case, whether the creditor, China which owns the US Treasury securities, or the
debtor, the American government which issued them, would hold the upperhand is unclear. The creditor can pressure the debtor, but if pressured, the
debtor can always default on obligations. In the early 1980s, when Latin American governments defaulted on their obligations to US banks, the creditors
were threatened as much as the debtors who found themselves without access
to required capital.24
Is the terror of economic turmoil so terrible when compared to the alternative possibility of losing the ability to govern? Among authoritarian
states, China being one, that decision has rarely been a difficult choice. Maintaining power and dealing with the consequences is frequently preferred to
the alternative. Moreover, given the fact that the choice of market manipulation does not require direct military confrontation, that option may appeal to
Chinese leaders.
Deterring such a strategy might be more appealing if neither side
took measures to protect themselves. After all, in such a case both might be
deterred from acting irrationally, especially when each side is beholden to the
other. In this scenario, that may not always be true. China’s leaders have far
more at stake than those of the United States. When one side perceives its
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risks far differently than the other, deterrence is often difficult to achieve.
Differences in risk perception can destabilize the balance as easily as new defensive measures. In any case, an adversary’s perceptions can never be fully
known; requiring a greater reliance on one’s own defensive measures. An example of such a relationship was the fact that neither the Soviet Union nor the
United States ever ceased developing new defensive capabilities, despite the
prevalence of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War era.

Defensive Measures
Actions the United States might take to counter an economic crisis
brought about through financial and commodity market manipulation should
be exercised on two fronts. First, America should quickly move to mitigate
the worst effects of these manipulative shocks. Then, it should move to dissuade any adversary of his ability or willingness to continue.
Damage Containment
To stem the damage from China’s liquidation of its dollar reserves,
the United States would face a challenge similar to that previously faced by
other nations during their own financial crises. America would have to
sharply increase short-term interest rates in order to lure institutions and investors to buy US Treasury securities on international markets. The ability of
the Federal Reserve to stabilize the dollar in the event of such large trade volumes is ambiguous, given the failures of Asian and European central banks to
do so during their own crises. Yet in the example we have created, not absorbing the excess US Treasury securities would threaten the credibility of the
dollar as a reserve asset.
The United States could also turn to its economic partners in Asia
and Europe for assistance from their central banks to support the dollar. As
they did during the credit crisis of 2007, central banks would likely agree to
coordinate their efforts. Foreign largesse is not without end, however; they
would want reassurances that Washington was taking steps to end Beijing’s
bid to further weaken America’s currency. Unfortunately, Washington has
few means to temper the concurrent upsurge in oil prices in the wake of a major disruption. Its only real recourse is to release oil from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve onto the open market. Although the circumstances outlined
might merit such an action, its effectiveness in lowering the price of oil is unclear. Given the fact that the reserve contains only a 60-day supply of petroleum, when combined with any increased level of international uncertainty,
some might view such a release with diminished euphoria and more with
anxiety.25
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Rollback
Damage control can only do so much. Market manipulation actions
could eventually exhaust all damage control efforts and cause even greater harm
to the American economy. Mexico, Thailand, South Korea, and other countries
learned that lesson during their financial crises of the 1990s. The United States is
obligated to seek ways to counter China’s ability to execute any market manipulation, thereby reducing its willingness to consider such a plan.
There is the possibility that China might alter its strategy; it could just
as easily sell its dollar reserves and derivative assets on world markets. To do
so, China would have to execute transactions through over-the-counter markets and financial exchanges, all of which operate on certain assumptions. Any
change in those assumptions might well impair Beijing’s ability to continue
any manipulative effort. In the face of massive dollar sales, the Federal Reserve
could levy new requirements on banks under its purview to cover all short positions in US Treasury securities at the end of each trading day. It would, however, have to act on a global scale to be effective.26 The European Central Bank
and Bank of Japan would have to levy similar requirements for over-thecounter markets. Together, they could slow trading and reduce the volume of
transactions, giving the markets time to recover. US equity markets have trading curbs for much the same reason. Such a tactic would probably be reinforced
with an increase in overnight interest rates and reserve requirements, providing
additional stability related to market liquidity.
The Federal Reserve could go even further and require financial institutions to post a bond in order to buy or sell US Treasury securities. Such a
move would effectively lower the volume that any trader could execute at one
time, diminishing selling pressure even more. While difficult to accomplish,
Washington could attempt to restrict the flow of electronic transfers out of the
United States, making it even more difficult to repatriate the proceeds from
dollar sales. These temporary changes in the manner in which US financial
markets operate would undoubtedly diminish America’s reputation for operating the freest markets in the world. One can only speculate that such
changes would be welcomed during a time of market turmoil.
Even after encountering such hurdles, China might seek avenues
beyond the reach of American influence in an effort to continue its market
manipulation. In such a scenario the United States should consider action to
weaken China’s resolve. There are a myriad of ways to increase threats of
economic damage to the Chinese economy. Despite the Chinese economy’s
fantastic growth over the last two decades, it still retains significant weaknesses. China’s financial institutions and capital markets remain immature,
and their resilience under pressure has yet to be tested. China’s equity mar54
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kets are a good example of this lack of resilience. Governmental rules and
regulations have stunted their development. Only in 2005 did Chinese regulators phase out the two-tiered share system, which permitted a special class
of controlling interest shares that was held by the government and created
great uncertainty for investors.27 Chinese debt markets were hobbled in a
similar manner. In fact, regulators only began in August 2007 to remove a
rigid quota system and lengthy government approval process for the issuance of corporate debt. 28
Despite the rapidity of China’s economic expansion, its equity and
debt markets have played a minor role in financing investment. Instead the
Chinese banking sector has been almost singularly responsible for channeling capital into industry and investment venues. Given the lack of effective
macroeconomic devices available to the PBOC, Beijing has tried to manage
the pace of its national economic growth almost exclusively through its banking sector. By fine-tuning its banks’ reserve ratios and directing their investments, Beijing has been able to generally control capital formation and
regulate economic growth while still keeping inflation in check. As earnings
have become a major driver of investment, Beijing’s ability to control growth
has declined and inflation has returned. 29
Beijing’s constant tinkering has done little to keep its banking sector
healthy. Since the late 1990s, the Chinese government has injected more than
$260 billion into its banks and removed many nonperforming loans from their
portfolios in an effort to ensure solvency. A new loan classification system
was put in place to reveal faulty loans more rapidly. Beijing’s need to maintain economic growth and unemployment at acceptable levels has resulted in
a strategy of continuing loans to wasteful government infrastructure projects
and inefficient state-owned enterprises. While the loans have kept many of
these enterprises afloat, they have created excess capacity in a number of industries, hindering value creation in the private sector. Meanwhile, the banking sector has begun to accumulate much more debt. 30
The criticality of China’s banks and their inherent brittleness make
them an ideal target for nations wishing to ratchet up the threat of economic damage. The aim of such a strategy would be to destabilize the banks by draining
their liquidity faster than Beijing could replenish it. Washington might consider
freezing Chinese bank assets in the United States, as the US Treasury Department has done to other nations in the past. America could press offshore banking
centers to freeze Chinese bank accounts, particularly those belonging to the
PBOC. These actions would begin to limit the amount of assets that China could
employ in any manipulative effort. Applying even greater pressure, Washington
could prevent all Chinese corporate, financial, and government entities from
participating in clearinghouse operations managed in the United States. These
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operations are a critical link to the functioning of monetary transactions around
the world. Without access to these, Chinese entities would find it extremely difficult to transact business even if they had access to capital.
Finally, the United States could endeavor to deprive Chinese entities
of access to new sources of capital. Washington might instruct American companies to remit all their outstanding debts related to Chinese entities into a special government-controlled fund, which would be invested in US Treasury
securities. That would have the dual effect of removing a potential source of
new revenue for China while providing the Federal Reserve with a supplementary source of funding in support of the dollar. Washington might even consider
requiring all US equity markets to delist Chinese companies in an effort to diminish their ability to raise fresh capital from international markets. All of
these possible measures when combined could bring China’s banking sector
and many of its export-oriented industries to the brink of collapse.

Policy Implications
American policymakers have begun to notice the vulnerabilities that
the United States faces from large amounts of debt in foreign hands. So far announced remedies have fallen short. One Senator suggested that Washington
set “a benchmark for foreign-held US debt that would trigger some sort of
White House action.”31 Unfortunately, the imposition of such a benchmark in
the absence of any crisis would more than likely lead to heightened concerns
over the reliability of the dollar and hasten its decline. Any benchmark would
serve to attract market manipulators of all stripes. Yet the suggestion does underscore the difficulty associated with tracking the identity of debt holders,
often hidden by third-party custodians. For example, if “a German resident
holds a US corporate bond through a custodian in Luxembourg, the US (government) survey will attribute the holdings to Luxembourg.” 32 Greater transparency regarding the holders of US Treasury securities would provide useful
information for not only policy actions related to countering market manipulation, but also those concerned with combating terrorism.
With regard to global economic policy, it would be extremely difficult for the United States to escape any cycle of debt and account deficits. Primarily due to the fact that the factors which created them provide short-term
political and economic incentives for both the United States and its trading
partners. 33 Rectifying the situation, according to one study, would require a
major devaluation of the dollar, by as much as 25 percent, in order to revive
and sustain “aggregate growth in the United States . . . so long as domestic demand was curtailed by restrictive fiscal measures while overseas demand was
increased by an accompanying fiscal expansion.”34 Such actions would be
difficult to achieve even under the best of circumstances, as they would re56

Parameters

quire unpalatable domestic policies in the United States, China, and elsewhere, and near concurrent implementation.
When addressing the possibility of manipulation of international energy markets, the US government should focus on paring its exposure in the
oil market, since that is where potentially hostile countries are most influential. While boosting domestic oil production could lower the price of oil, it
would still leave the United States vulnerable to manipulated price spikes.
Since the United States principally uses petroleum for transportation and industrial fuels, policies that promote substitutes for these fuels would be the
best long-term solutions. Although still controversial, the increased use of
ethanol is one step in that direction. 35
Given the uncertainties in the world’s financial and commodity markets and the growing foreign influence over them, Washington needs to have
a plan in place to counter the possibility of market manipulation by foreign
governments. Financial and commodity crises can occur with alarming
speed. To date, America’s response to market distortions has been improvised; for example, the Treasury Department’s rescue plan during the Mexican financial crisis from 1994-95, the Federal Reserve interventions in the
LTCM debacle in 1998, and the credit crisis that began in 2007. In retrospect,
everyone in Washington in a position of responsibility could have benefited
from an understanding of the true range of options available and their repercussions. Given the fact that financial and commodity market manipulation
could be employed as part of a larger confrontation with the United States,
these financial plans should be a critical part of America’s defense planning.

Conclusion
With the world’s primary reserve currency its own, the United States
has been able to finance a high-level of consumption while maintaining relatively low inflation and interest rates. As foreign central banks have amassed
even greater amounts of dollars, the American government is beginning to
risk losing control over its own currency. When combined with a heavy dependence on certain resources, such as oil, this unsettling trend has left the
United States vulnerable to manipulation in any number of global markets.
This article examined only China’s capability to execute a hostile financial and commodity market manipulation strategy. Other countries—such
as a resurgent Russia, which possesses nearly $400 billion in dollar reserves
and substantial oil resources—could generate a similar threat. Wherever the
threat materializes, the United States has to be prepared with well-coordinated
plans capable of countering the gravest of threats to its economic security. In
the market, things often have to get very bad before they get better. But as any
trader will tell you: it is better never to have to experience those bad times.
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